



**DECLARATION OF INTENT  
IN RESPECT OF THE  
IMPLEMENTATION  
OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
SET OUT IN:**

**THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO TRAIN PROTECTIONS SYSTEMS  
THE LADBROKE GROVE RAIL INQUIRY (PART 1 REPORT)  
THE LADBROKE GROVE RAIL INQUIRY (PART 2 REPORT)**

**(original signed 11 December 2001 but mislaid)  
11 DECEMBER 2002**

# **SIGNATORIES**

**Pam Warren**  
**On behalf of the members of**  
**Paddington Survivors Group** .....

**Simon Benham**  
**On behalf of the members of**  
**Paddington Survivors Group** .....

**The Rt. Hon Alistair Darling MP**  
**Secretary of State**  
**Department of Transport** .....

**Mr. Tim Collings MP**  
**Shadow Transport Minister**  
**Conservative Party** .....

**Ms Gwenyth Dunwoody MP**  
**Labour Party**  
**Transport Select Committee** .....

**The Rt. Hon Charles Kennedy MP**  
**Leader - Liberal Democrat Party** .....

**Mr Bob Crow**  
**RMT (General Secretary)** .....

**Mr Richard Bowker**  
**Chairman & Chief Executive**  
**Strategic Rail Authority** .....

**Mr Chris Leah**  
**Safety Director**  
**Network Rail** .....

**Mr George Muir**  
**ATOC (Chairman)** .....

**Mr David Weir**  
**ATOC (Director)** .....

**Mr Michael Rix**  
**ASLEF (General Secretary)** .....

**Mr Richard Rosser**  
**TSSA (General Secretary)** .....

**Mr Alan Tipping**  
**TSSA (Policy Officer)** .....

We the undersigned:

- ◆ acknowledge the establishment by the Health and Safety Commission, with the consent of the Deputy Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon John Prescott MP, of the Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems and the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry, arising out of the rail disasters at Southall on 19 September 1997 and Ladbroke Grove on October 5 1999;
- ◆ also acknowledge the endeavours of Lord Cullen [and Professor Uff] in conducting the Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems and the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry and publishing the report into The Joint Inquiry Into Train Protection Systems (March 2001) and The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Part 1 (June 2001) and Part 2 (September 2001) Reports [the Reports];
- ◆ accept the advisability of the recommendations in respect of the Train Protection Warning System, Advanced Train Protection Systems, SPAD prevention measures, the recommendations for the improvements of safety and the management of safety and the regulatory regime, and other measures set out in the Reports;
- ◆ understand that we are among those cited by Lord Cullen to implement the recommendation as set out in the Reports, or being such that we may assist or cooperate with those responsible for their implementation, or otherwise encourage their implementation;
- ◆ publicly declare that we will strive to fully implement, assist with the implementation of, and encourage the implementation of, all recommendations set out in the Reports, *within* the timescale set down in the Reports (or as from time to time amended on the advice of the Health and Safety Commission), and as set out in summary below.

11 December 2001

REP.	ACTION & TIMESCALE	RESP.
JITPS 12.10	<p><b>NOW</b></p> <p><b>ETCS Fitment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All new rolling stock should be compatible with ETCS and GSM-R fitment. (Davies recommendations 11).</li> </ul>	ROSCOs TOCS
JITPS 12.11	<p><b>SPAD reduction and mitigation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All SPADRAM measures should be continued unless and until HMRI are satisfied that they are unnecessary (para 11.32). The following measures should be pursued in particular.</li> <li>Research into multi-SPAD signals and into the cause of multiple SPADs should be continued. (para 11.32).</li> <li>Procedures for the dissemination of information and for the design and implementation of mitigation measures following multiple-SPADs should be kept under review. (para 11.32).</li> <li>Analytical methods (including that of Dr Ian Murphy) aimed at identifying signals which pose the greatest risks, should be pursued with urgency. (para 11.32).</li> <li>Research into human factors should continue with particular emphasis on its application to driver selection, training and management and signal sighting issues. (para 11.32).</li> <li>HMRI should implement the proposal for research into the possibility of conflict between defensive driving and punctuality. (para 10.13).</li> <li>Use of the Drivers' Reminder Appliance should be standardised and work on the automatic version pursued. (para 11.32).</li> </ul>	RT, TOCs HMRI  Railway Safety Ltd & TOCs  As above  Railway Safety Ltd  Railway Safety Ltd & TOCs  HMRI  HMRI ATOC
JITPS 12.12	<p><b>Stopping Trains</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The programme for the development and retro-fitting of Enhanced Emergency Braking (EEB) should be continued with urgency, including the identification of any further classes which it is not appropriate to exempt. (para 11.34).</li> <li>Improvement of braking on HSTs and rolling stock running at speeds in excess of 100 mph should be regarded as a priority. (para 11.34).</li> <li>The use of sanders to maintain and enhance adhesion should be pursued and a programme of trial fitment drawn up. (para 11.34).</li> <li>No change in regulation policy to avoid presenting red signals to trains not capable of being stopped by TPWS should be considered without a full assessment and analysis of the consequences. (para 11.33).</li> </ul>	ROSCOs  HMRI ROSCOs  As above  RT & TOCs

JITPS  12.8	<b>TPWS Fitment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• For the fitment of train-borne TPWS, AWS components should be replaced to the maximum extent practicable. For this purpose the ATOC TPWS Executive should draw up a standard for the replacement of AWS in train-borne TPWS equipment. (para 6.18).</li></ul>	ATOC ROSCOs

JITPS 12.5	<p><b>JANUARY 2002</b></p> <p><b>Train protection warning system (TPWS)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk assessment should be carried out to identify junction signals where the risk from SPADs is insignificant. Consideration should be given to obtaining exemptions for such signals from track fitment. (para 11.16).</li> </ul>	RT
JITPS 12.8	<p><b>TPWS Fitment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All parties should co-operate in the production and updating of a resource allocation programme directed towards the matching of track and rolling stock fitment, in order to maximise the early attainment of TPWS protection. (para 11.17).</li> <li>• The accelerated programme should be reviewed and updated to ensure that it is compatible with the early attainment of TPWS protection and that any adverse consequences do not outweigh the benefit of acceleration fitment. (para 11.17).</li> <li>• Steps should be taken to ensure that TPWS fitment is completed in such time and manner as not to delay fitment of ETCS. (para 11.11).</li> </ul>	RT & TOCS HMRI  RT & TOCS HMRI  RT & TOCS HMRI
JITPS 12.10	<p><b>ETCS Fitment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A System Authority should be established to oversee and direct the timely fitment of ETCS, including the current programme for the Old Dalby test track. (para 11.22).</li> <li>• For the purpose of avoiding delays, fitment of ETCS should be independently monitored with reports being submitted at intervals of not more than 6 months, stating whether fitment of ETCS has been delayed or impeded by work on TPWS fitment. (para 11.11).</li> </ul>	RT & TOC'S ROSCOs  RT HMRI TOC'S ROSCOs
Part 1  3.  4.	<p><b>Support of the bereaved and injured</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The police service, in co-operation with the emergency services, should use their best endeavours to ensure that common telephone numbers are issued for the use of members of the public who are seeking to give or obtain information about persons who have, or may have, been involved in a major incident. (para 4.122).</li> <li>• The Railway Group should review emergency planning, including liaison with the emergency services, arrangements for the aftercare of survivors and the provision of support and facilities for the bereaved and injured. (para 4.122).</li> </ul>	ACPO ACPOS  Railway Group Members
Part 1  5.	<p><b>Track and signalling changes</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Where a material change to track or signalling or both is proposed, there should be an express consideration of all relevant safety issued by an analysis of the material factors, if necessary by means of risk assessment. This should be done on a holistic basis at the design concept stage and repeated at defined stages up to and including full implementation. (para 7.17).</i></li> </ul>	Railtrack

<p>Part 1</p> <p>6.</p>	<p><b>Implementation of Formal Inquiry recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Railtrack procedures, and the actions of management to enforce them, should be directed to ensuring that:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) <i>a recommendation which is accepted is implemented according to a defined timescale;</i></li> <li>(i) <i>the person to whom a recommendation is allocated for implementation is required periodically the action which has been taken, the state of progress and the reasons for any delay;</i></li> <li>(ii) <i>the monitoring of the implementation of a recommendation is assigned to an identified individual whose duties are clearly defined, whether by job description, formal instruction, or training or a combination of these methods;</i></li> <li>(iii) <i>the person to whom monitoring is assigned is required to ensure that the recommendation is implemental according to a defined timescale;</i></li> <li>(iv) <i>a recommendation should be not be abandoned unless, exceptionally, this is shown to be fully justified to the person to whom monitoring is assigned;</i></li> <li>(v) <i>any management system to which the recommendation relates is altered to align it with the recommendation;</i></li> <li>(vi) <i>the effectiveness of a recommendation is audited after its implementation;</i></li> <li>(vii) <i>full records are kept of all recommendations and their state of progress; and</i></li> <li>(viii) <i>there is a system for the central tracking of</i></li> <li>(ix) <i>recommendations which are directed to Railtrack Line and those which, either immediately or thereafter, are directed to one or more of the Zones. (para 7.106).</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Railtrack</p>
<p>Part 1</p> <p>8.</p> <p>9.</p> <p>10.</p>	<p><b>Signalling in the Paddington area</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Railtrack should ensure that the risk assessments and any consequent actions required under Group Standard GK/RT 0078 in respect of the signals in the Paddington area are carried out as soon as possible.</li> <li>• <i>Railtrack should conduct a safety examination of the layout over 0-2 miles from Paddington Station so as to satisfy the HMRI, if necessary by a risk assessment and additional measures, that it is safe for operation at current speeds and to current traffic arrangements. Such a safety examination should be repeated before the implementation of any change which is or may constitute, in the opinion of the HMRI, a material change of circumstances.</i></li> <li>• <i>No change should be made in the direction of running on line 3 or in the current speed limits on any of the lines out to two miles six chains from Paddington Station unless and until the following have been done to satisfaction of the HMRI, namely:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) <i>a risk assessment has demonstrated that the change can be implemented in safety, and if this can be achieved only if certain measures are taken, what these measures are; and</i></li> <li>(ii) <i>such measures have been implemented and shown to be effective</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Railtrack</p> <p>As above</p> <p>As above</p>

	<p><i>The risk assessment should take account of the following possible measures, inter alia:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>(i) the conversion of four-aspect to three-aspect signals;</i></li> <li><i>(ii) the addition of flank protection at SN109 and elsewhere if appropriate</i></li> <li><i>(iii) the installation of standard, simple, non-distracting and consistent means of line identification;</i></li> <li><i>(iv) the alternation of the height, configuration and mounting of signals; and</i></li> <li><i>(v) the installation of an additional gantry to the east of Portobello Bridge for carrying Down signals previously carried on gantry 8.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>The risk assessment should be carried out by persons independent of Railtrack and in accordance with usual standards and the best available methods. It should take account of human factors which may affect the actions of drivers and signallers, and any risks which the carrying out of any of these measures might create.</i></p> <p><b>Driver management and training</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Thames trains should increase the frequency of the briefing of drivers with a view to ensuring that each driver has a face to face meeting with his or her driver standards manager at least monthly, if not more often, and safety should be the first item on the agenda of these meetings. (para 9.29).</i></li> <li>• <i>The adoption of TOCs of the teaching and practice of defensive driving is endorsed. (para 9.39).</i></li> <li>• <i>TOCs should review the effectiveness of the systems in place to deliver the required level of driver competence at least once every three years, and should retest the driver against the revised systems at the same frequency. (para 9.39).</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Safety Auditing</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The safety audit process should be strengthened, and the quality of communication during the process should be improved. (para 9.44).</i></li> <li>• <i>An organisation the activities of which are being audited should disclose all material and relevant information to the auditor in regard to the area of the activity which is being audited. (para 9.46).</i></li> </ul> <p><b>Signal sighting</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The standard on signal sighting should require that explicit consideration is to be given to the readability of a signal. It should be made clear that the fact that a signal complies with a minimum requirement is not of itself to be taken as meaning that it is adequate. (para 11.13).</i></li> <li>• <i>The standard on signal sighting should deal explicitly with the additional time required for the reading of certain signals, including (but not necessarily limited to) those mounted on gantries. (para 11.13).</i></li> <li>• <i>Human factors experts should be involved in the revision of the standard on signal sighting. (para 11.13).</i></li> </ul>	<p>Thames Trains</p> <p>TOCs</p> <p>TOCs</p> <p>Railway Safety Railtrack TOCs</p> <p>Railtrack TOCs</p> <p>Railway Safety</p> <p>As above</p>
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24.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The reference to “very short duration” in the standard on signal sighting should be clarified. (para 11.14).</i></li> </ul>	As above
25.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The expression “overhead line equipment” in the Group Standard on signal sighting should be clarified by the statement that it refers only to wires and droppers. (para 11.16)</i></li> </ul>	As above
27.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The standard on signal sighting define acceptable limits to the temporary obscuration of a signal, subject to the overriding right of a signal sighting committee to determine whether the nature and extent of the interruption in the individual case is such that the sighting is unacceptable. (para 11.16).</i></li> </ul>	As above
28.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The standard on signal sighting should explicitly define the cab sight lines within which signals must be positioned by reference to the envelop governing the position of the driver’s eye which is specified for each particular rolling stock. (para 11.17)</i></li> </ul>	As above
29.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>It should form part of Railtrack’s safety management system that is the responsibility of senior Zone operating and signal engineering management to decide whether the recommendations of a signal sighting committee under the Group Standard on SPADs are to be implemented and, if not, what alternative measures are to be taken, and, in either event, that the relevant measures are implemented. (para 11.22).</i></li> </ul>	As above
32.	<p><b>SPAD investigation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The Group Standard on SPADs and its associated documentation should be reviewed to ensure that there is no presumption that driver error is the sole or principal cause, or that any part played by the infrastructure is only a contributory factor. (para 11.27).</i></li> </ul>	As above
Part 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The use of the word “disregard” in the Group Standard on SPADs and its associated documentation should be reconsidered. (para 11.29).</i></li> </ul>	Railway Safety
33.	<p><b>Signallers’ instructions</b></p>	As Above
34.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The instructions for signallers as to their response to a SPAD should be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) clarified; and</li> <li>(b) set out in a single set of instructions, while if there are matters which are specific to a particular area they should be covered by separate local instructions. (para 12.9)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Railtrack
36.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The instructions for signallers should state explicitly that the signaller is expected, in the event of a SPAD, to make an assessment and to take action immediately. (para 12.10).</li> </ul>	As above
37.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The instructions for signallers should provide a set of options, including the use of the CSR (where it is available) either to send an emergency stop message to a particular train or a general stop message. This range of options should be supported by full and regularly repeated briefing as to the type of circumstances in which each option is or may be appropriate. (para 12.11).</li> </ul>	As above
38.		

	<b>Signallers' training and briefing</b>	
Part 1 39.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Railtrack should institute a system whereby all signallers in the signal box (or centre) are briefed by their line manager following SPAD in their area, and there is appropriate dissemination of information which may be of assistance to signallers elsewhere. (para 12.13).</li> </ul>	As above
40.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Railtrack should ensure that the reports which are made to the Zone about a SPAD should include a report by the signaller as to the actions taken by him or her and the reasons for such actions. (para 12.13).</li> </ul>	As above
	<b>Signallers' working conditions</b>	
Part 1 43.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Railtrack should review the work done by signallers to identify all non-essential tasks and eliminate them from the work which is performed by them while they are in charge of a workstation. (para 12.17).</i></li> </ul>	Railtrack
46.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Railtrack management should set out the criteria for allowing signallers, in exceptional circumstances, to exceed the maximum of 72 hours of work per week, and ensure that these criteria are, and continue to be, correctly applied. (para 12.19).</li> </ul>	As above
	<b>IECC equipment</b>	
Part 1 47.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>There should be a unique alarm for SPADs which should sound until it is turned off. (para 12.19).</i></li> </ul>	Railtrack
	<b>Preservation of data</b>	
Part 1 52.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Signallers, managers and maintenance staff working at IECCs should be instructed as to the need to preserve CSR data disks in the event of a SPAD taking place. (para 12.30).</li> </ul>	Railtrack
	<b>Crashworthiness</b>	
Part 1 59.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The enhancement of the security of seating in Turbos and of tables in HSTs should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting. (para 13.19).</li> </ul>	TOCs ROSCOs
	<b>Passenger protection, evacuation and escape</b>	
Part 1 62.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The scope of Schedule 1 to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 should be extended so as to include explicitly the arrangements which the duty holder has established in regard to facilities, instructions and signs for the escape of persons in an emergency. (para 14.3).</li> </ul>	HSE
67.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Passengers should be given general safety advice both before and after they have boarded their train. (para 14.14).</li> </ul>	TOCs
68.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Expert assistance should be obtained on the advice which should be given to passengers as to what to do in the event of there being a known threat of serious danger to them in remaining on board. (para 14.14).</i></li> </ul>	ATOC
69.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The provision on board of explanatory information about the emergency facilities of individual trains is endorsed. (para 14.14).</i></li> </ul>	TOCs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The use of on-board announcements to draw attention to safety information is endorsed. (para 14.16).</i></li> </ul>	TOCs

<p>70.</p> <p>75.</p> <p>77.</p> <p>79.</p> <p>83</p> <p>88.</p> <p>Part 1</p> <p>89.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The provision of ‘snap wands’ should be considered as a supplementary means of providing lighting in an emergency. (para 14.22).</li> <li>• <i>The staff-only doors on all trains should have an override device to enable them to be used by passengers in an emergency. (para 14.29).</i></li> <li>• The daily routine check of every train should include confirming that all ladders can readily be used. A mechanism to enable ladders to be released quickly should be devised and fitted. (para 14.35).</li> <li>• <i>The incorporation of escape hatches in existing carriages should be the subject of feasibility and risk assessment and the provision of escape hatches in new carriages should likewise be considered. (para 14.54).</i></li> <li>• The availability on trains carrying passengers of the items of emergency equipment mentioned in the standard on emergency and safety equipment should be unrestricted. (para 14.74).</li> </ul> <p><b>The implementation of recommendations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>A review of compliance with the above recommendations should be conducted on behalf of the HSC within six months of publication of this report, and further reviews should be put in hand as necessary thereafter. The HSC should publish the outcome of such reviews. (para 15.7).</i></li> </ul>	<p>TOCs</p> <p>TOCs</p> <p>TOCs ROSCOs</p> <p>TOCs</p> <p>TOCs ROSCOs Manufacturers</p> <p>ATOC</p> <p>HSC</p>

Part 2	<p><b>MARCH 2002</b></p> <p><b>Interfaces and number of franchises</b></p>	
1.	<p>Railtrack and ATOC should work jointly with the RITC to set up a task force for ensuring that the need for a skilled and properly trained workforce at all levels of the industry is met. (para 4.35).</p>	<p>Railtrack ATOC RITC</p>
Part 2.	<p><b>The use of contractors</b></p>	
4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Steps should be put in place to ensure that contractors and sub-contractors are selected by a process which gives due regard to their state of training. They should be given appropriate time further to develop their training and planning as necessary before embarking on work. (para 4.72).</li> </ul>	<p>Railtrack IMCs TRCs</p>
5.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Steps should be taken to ensure that the quality of work carried out by contractors and sub-contractors entirely meet the required standards, and that any deficiencies are addressed in a timely manner. (para 4.75).</li> </ul>	<p>As above</p>
6.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Sentinel system should be reinforced with specific reference to the need to record the total hours that any individual works on the railways, and to ensure that the Sentinel card is clearly ‘tied’ to an individual. (para 4.80).</li> </ul>	<p>As above</p>
7.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The steps taken to reduce the number of sub-contractors are endorsed. (para 4.82).</li> </ul>	
8.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The taking by Railtrack of a direct and active role in the close day to day management of safety-critical work is endorsed. (para 4.83).</li> </ul>	
9.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employers of contractors and sub-contractors should ensure that they work to exactly the same safety standards as those who are directly employed. (para 4.87).</li> </ul>	<p>Railtrack IMCs TRCs</p>
10.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The proposal of a training school for contractor staff is endorsed. (para 4.87).</li> </ul>	
Part 2	<p><b>Safety leadership within individual companies</b></p>	
13.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Companies in the rail industry should be expected to demonstrate that they have, and implement, a system to ensure that senior management spend an adequate amount of time to safety issues, with front line staff. (para 5.23).</li> </ul>	<p>Rail industry</p>
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where it is not already in place, safety management strategic leadership team should be established in each company in the rail industry. Such a team should be led by the Chief Executive and include his or her direct reports, with support from the safety professionals. It should consider the strategic management process for safety by holding regular meetings devoted to health and safety by holding regular meetings devoted to health and safety issues. It should be the key group in the organisation for setting goals, monitoring performance and assessing and resourcing the needs of the organisation to ensure that the long-term objectives are met. (para 5.24).</li> </ul>	<p>As above</p>

<p>Part 2</p> <p>15.</p> <p>Part 2</p> <p>38.</p> <p>Part 2</p> <p>64.</p> <p>68.</p> <p>73.</p>	<p><b>Communication</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety meetings should be used as a means of two-way communication between management and the workplace, and should be linked directly to safety management leadership teams referred to in the previous recommendation. (para 5.34).</li> </ul> <p><b>The safety regulator</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The extent of passenger representation of the RIAC should be re-considered. (para 9.80)</li> </ul> <p><b>Accident investigation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Save and to the extent that there is good reason to the contrary, representatives of persons who have been affected by an accident should be allowed to attend, as observers, formal inquiries into more serious accidents. There should be a criterion for the purpose of determining for which inquiries this would be suitable. (para 11.14).</li> <li>• The proposal of an appeal against a finding of a formal inquiry should be the subject of further study. (para 11.16).</li> <li>• The statements made by witnesses in connection with RAIB inquiries and industry inquiries and investigations should not be disclosed to the police, save by order of a judge. (para 11.32).</li> </ul>	<p>Rail industry</p> <p>HSC</p> <p>Railway Safety</p> <p>As above</p> <p>HSC</p>

Part 1	<p><b>JUNE 2002</b></p>	
Part 1	<p><b>Implementation of Formal Inquiry recommendations</b></p>	
7.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consideration should be given to extending sub-para (ix) of Recommendation 6 to recommendations which are directed to one or more of the TOCs and others. (para 7.106).</li> </ul>	Railtrack
Part 1	<p><b>Driver management and training</b></p>	
11.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signallers and drivers should jointly attend away days and other training processes to develop their mutual understanding. (para 9.28).</li> </ul>	Railtrack TOCs
15.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ATOC study on the central licensing of drivers should be progressed expeditiously. (9.50)</li> </ul>	ATOC
16.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ATOC should consider the application of NVQs to the driver licensing scheme presently under their consideration. (para 9.52)</li> </ul>	As above
18.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thames Trains and other TOCs should ensure that their driver training and testing programmes adequately reflect the need for specific, relevant and validated criteria. Drivers should be tested against these criteria, and a definite pass standard should be established. Consideration should be given as to how often drivers should repeat key steps in their training before submitting themselves for testing. (para 9.64).</li> </ul>	Thames Trains TOCs
19.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further research should be carried out to develop the understanding of human factors as they relate to train driving. (para 9.66).</li> </ul>	Railway Safety TOCs
Part 1	<p><b>Signal sighting</b></p>	
26.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Areas where ambiguity in the meaning of “very short duration” may have caused, or may still cause, problems should be identified. There should be a retrospective review of all locations where this may be the case, so that appropriate action may be taken. (para 11.14).</i></li> </ul>	Railtrack
31.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Railtrack, in consultation with the TOCs, should examine the availability of signal sighters to meet the expected workload and take all necessary steps to ensure that there is an adequate supply of trained signal sighters and an adequate range of skills. (para 11.20).</li> </ul>	Railtrack TOCs
Part 1	<p><b>SPAD investigation</b></p>	
35.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Persons who investigate, and make recommendations as a consequence of SPADs should be trained in the identification of human factors and in root cause analysis. Their competence in these areas should be formally recorded, and renewed by refresher courses. The analysis of SPAD data should be specifically directed to eliciting the part played by human factors and assessing the significance of the hazards against which the signals which have been passed at Danger were intended to afford protection. (para 11.31).</li> </ul>	Railtrack TOCS
Part 1	<p><b>Signallers’ training and briefing</b></p>	
42.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Railtrack and the TOCs should take steps to ensure that signallers and drivers obtain a full appreciation of the nature and demands of each other’s work. (para 12.16).</li> </ul>	Railtrack TOCS

44.	<p><b>Signallers' working conditions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A supervisor should be employed on a continual basis to ensure that the workstations are operated in the most effective way. (para 12.17).</li> </ul>	Railtrack
Part 1 48.	<p><b>IECC equipment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The speed with which signallers can take action to move points in an emergency should be improved. (para 12.22).</li> </ul>	Railtrack
Part 1 53.	<p><b>Crashworthiness</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The enhancement of the caps on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting. (para 13.4)</i></li> </ul>	TOCs ROSCOs
54.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53. (para 13.4)</i></li> </ul>	Railway Safety
55.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>In the case of Turbos, the enhancement of end pillar weld connections, the possible enhancement of crashworthiness by weakening the ends and strengthening the saloon of the cars, and the fitting of shear-out couplers and anti-overriding devices should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting. (para 13.5).</i></li> </ul>	TOCs ROSCOs
56.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space. (para 13.5).</i></li> </ul>	Railway Safety
58.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The revision of the Group Standard for crashworthiness should be pursued with particular reference to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>the design requirements for more realistic scenarios;</i></li> <li><i>high speed accidents; and dynamic verification testing (para 13.17).</i></li> <li><i>dynamic verification testing</i></li> </ol> </li> </ul>	Railway Safety
60.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comprehensive market research in regard to safety related measures should be carried out in order to take account of the views of informed passengers. (para 13.20).</li> </ul>	TOCs
Part 1 61.	<p><b>Fire mitigation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The following measures should be considered with a view to enhancing protection against fire:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>a review of Group Standards in respect of improved crash resistance of fuel tanks;</i></li> <li><i>consideration of the feasibility of reducing fuel inventories and of utilising smaller fuel tanks;</i></li> <li><i>in respect of frontal impacts, consideration of the repositioning of fuel tanks away from the leading ends of trains from behind bogies wherever this is practicable;</i></li> <li><i>avoidance of placing fuel tanks in exposed and</i></li> </ol> </li> </ul>	Railway Safety TOCs ROSCOs

	<p><i>vulnerable locations;</i></p> <p>(v) <i>examination of the use of additives to reduce the propensity of a fuel to atomise;</i></p> <p>(vi) <i>the employment within fuel tanks of internal flexible linings of a honeycomb construction;</i></p> <p>(vii) <i>consideration of the most appropriate material for fuel tanks; and</i></p> <p>(viii) <i>recognition of the need for supporting theoretical and experimental work in respect of the foregoing. (para 13.27).</i></p>	
Part 1	<b>Passenger protection, evacuation and escape</b>	
63.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The provisions in the schedule as to evacuation and escape should be supported by adequate guidance from the HSE. (para 14.3).</li> </ul>	HSE
65.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>So far as is feasible, the safety information issued to passengers and the means by which they can be evacuated or escape from a train should be standardised. (para 14.8).</li> </ul>	ATOC
71.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The requirement for emergency signs to be luminous should be made retrospective. (para 14.18).</li> </ul>	TOCs ROSCOs
72.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>So far as is feasible, emergency signs on all trains should be capable of being understood by passengers without the necessity to read text. (para 14.19).</i></li> </ul>	As above
78.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Signage primarily in the form of pictograms similar to those used on aircraft, and depicting the correct operation of emergency door mechanisms, should be developed. The signage should conform to current human factors standards on signage and be displayed prominently adjacent to each door and beside the door release mechanisms, as well as within the carriage. The mechanisms should be provided with artificial illumination to highlight their location at all times, with a back-up power supply in case of an emergency. (para 13.34).</i></li> </ul>	TOCs ROSCOs
80.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>There should be a thorough review of the adequacy of the number of, and signage relating to, emergency hammers. This should include the provision of means of illuminating the location of hammers in an emergency, with a back-up power supply in case of emergency. (para 14.46).</i></li> </ul>	As above
81.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>There should be research into the feasibility of, and risks associated with, removable windows, the adequacy of windows as a means of emergency egress, the number of dedicated windows which are necessary and the provision as to the maximum distance between each passenger and a bodyside door or emergency exit. (para 14.46).</i></li> </ul>	As above
82.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Tests should be carried out into the practicability of building emergency hammers into the passenger alarm system so that they could be released only after an alarm has been activated. (para 14.50).</i></li> </ul>	As above
84.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All members of the on-board train staff (including persons working under contract) should be persons who have been trained in train evacuation and protection. (para 14.62).</li> </ul>	TOCs
85.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The possibility of installing on driver-only trains a telephone by which passengers can communicate with the signaller in the even of the driver being killed or incapacitated should be studied. (para 14.65).</li> </ul>	Railtrack

<p>86.</p> <p>87.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The feasibility of a “roaming” communication system for train staff should be examined. (para 14.68).</i></li> <li>• The possibility of remote broadcasting from outside the train, where it is not already available, should be investigated. (para 14.68).</li> </ul>	<p>TOCs ROSCOs</p> <p>TOCs ROSCOs</p> <p>Railtrack TOCs ROSCOs</p>

<p>Part 2</p> <p>19.</p> <p>20.</p> <p>21.</p> <p>22.</p> <p>23.</p>	<p><b>SEPTEMBER 2002</b></p> <p><b>Safety cases</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The definition of responsibilities for the control of risk at specific sites which are shared by different railway operators and at the interfaces between them across the network should be refined and set out in the safety case. However, the details of the arrangements and agreements for these purposes should not be required to be set out in the safety case; it should be sufficient that the safety case provides information as to the means of access to them. (para 7.15).</li> <li>• <i>A duty holder should be required to show by means of its safety case that it has reduced the risks associated with its operation as low as reasonably practicable, but it should be sufficient if the safety case points to the methods which have been used and to where the details can be found. (para 7.20).</i></li> <li>• <i>Duty holders should be under a statutory duty to comply with Railway Group Standards in so far as they relate to matters of health and safety. (para 7.22).</i></li> <li>• The process of safety case acceptance should include the check that a system as described in the safety case is actually in place; whereas the audit would concentrate on how that system was working in practice and how it was ensuring and improving safety. (para 7.30).</li> <li>• <i>It is essential that companies operate a robust internal audit system, which should be both 'top down' and 'bottom-up'. (para 7.37).</i></li> </ul>	<p>Railtrack TOCs</p> <p>HSC Duty holders</p> <p>HSC</p> <p>HSE Railtrack</p> <p>Rail industry</p>
<p>Part 2</p> <p>28.</p> <p>29.</p> <p>30.</p>	<p><b>Railtrack and Railway Safety</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The safety regulator should cease to be dependent on Railtrack for a recommendation as to whether or not the safety case of a train operator or a station operator (or its material revisions) should be accepted. Instead the safety regulator should give Railtrack the opportunity to make any representation as to whether or not the safety case or revision should be accepted, and the grounds on which such a representation is based. The safety regulator should likewise give the opportunity to any other train operator or station operator who may be affected by matters referred to in the safety case to make a similar representation, and for this purpose select whichever operators it considers to be appropriate in the circumstances. (para 8.33).</i></li> <li>• If the safety regulator refuses to accept a safety case or its revision it should give the reasons for that decision. (para 8.33).</li> <li>• <i>In regard to the safety case for Railtrack or any material revision, the safety regulator should give any train operator, selecting whichever it considers to be appropriate in the circumstances, the opportunity to make representations as to whether or not the safety case or revision should be accepted, and the grounds on which the representation is based. (para 8.34).</i></li> </ul>	<p>HSC</p> <p>HSC</p> <p>HSC</p>
<p>Part 2</p> <p>36.</p>	<p><b>The safety regulator</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The HMRI should be placed under the direction of a new post, to be filled by a person of outstanding managerial ability, not necessarily</i></li> </ul>	<p>HSC</p>

Part 2  57.	<p><i>with a railway background. This post should be regarded as commanding a special salary level for the purpose. (para 9.66).</i></p> <p><b>Accident investigation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><i>The responsibility of the HSE for the investigation of rail accidents should be transferred to an independent body, here referred to for convenience as the RAIB.</i></li></ul>	HSC

	<b>JANUARY 2003</b>	
JITPS	<b>Extension of BR-ATP</b>	
	These recommendations apply to the ATP system currently in use on Railtrack Great Western and Midland Zone lines used by First Great Western and Chiltern Trains.	
12.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gaps which were left on original fitment of BR-ATP track equipment should be infilled to provide full continuous coverage between Paddington and Bristol Temple Meads and Marylebone and Aynho Junction (para 11.6)</li> </ul>	RT
JITPS	<b>Train protection and warning system (TPWS)</b>	
12.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The current mandated fitment of TPWS-A to trains and track should be reversed. (para 11.15).</li> <li>Track fitment should include all multi-SPAD signals unless they present no risk. (para 11.16).</li> <li>Risk assessments should be carried out on plain line signals, initially on those considered by TOCs to pose significant risk. (para 11.16).</li> </ul>	RT & TOCs RT RT & TOCS
JITPS	<b>TPWS+</b>	
12.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trials should be carried out on TPWS+ using single and multiple additional Over Speed Sensors (OSS) with the aim of drawing up a design standard and measuring the effect of additional OSS on different types of train and on driving techniques. (para 11.20).</li> </ul>	RT & TOCs
JITPS	<b>TPWS-E</b>	
12.8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fitment of TPWS-A should continue in accordance with the currently accelerated programme. (para 11.17).</li> </ul>	RT & TOCs
JITPS	<b>European Train Control System (ETCS)</b>	
12.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fitment of ETCS Levels 1 or 2 should be considered between Aynho Junction and Birmingham Snow Hill. (para 11.27).</li> <li>Fitment of ETCS train-borne equipment should be considered on Thames Trains using Great Western Lines, together with an STM to allow use to be made of BR-ATP equipment. (paras 11.8, 11.27).</li> </ul>	RT & TOCs ROSCOs As above
Part 1	<b>Signallers' training and briefing</b>	
41.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The use of simulators in providing fully effective training of signallers in dealing with emergencies is endorsed. (para 12.15).</li> </ul>	Railtrack
Part 1	<b>Automatic controls</b>	
49.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There should be study of the possibility of the automatic replacement of a signal to Danger where a SPAD has occurred and the layout is such that there is a significant danger of collision. (para 12.27).</li> <li>Subject to satisfactory risk assessment, an arrangement should be made</li> </ul>	Railtrack As above

50.	whereby, when a train which is fitted with the CSR passes a signal at Danger, an audible warning automatically sounds in the cab. (para 12.28)	
Part 1	<b>Radio communication</b>	
51.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There should be a national system of direct radio communication between trains and signallers. (para 12.29).</li> </ul>	Railtrack TOCs
Part 1	<b>Passenger protection, evacuation and escape</b>	
73.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There should be research with the aim of arriving at a system of signage which is common to all trains in Great Britain. (para 14.20).</li> </ul>	ATOC
74.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Research should be carried out into the means of safeguarding emergency lighting systems from disablement by the forces involved in sudden deceleration. (para 14.21).</li> </ul>	ROSCOs
76.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>In the case of every coach (on any train) which internal doors which slide in the same direction one of the following should be carried out by 31 December 2003:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) <i>the coach should be fitted instead with opposite-handed internal doors;</i></li> <li>(ii) <i>the coach should be fitted instead with double leaf internal doors; or</i></li> <li>(iii) <i>a panel in the door should be rendered removable so as to enable passengers to pass through.</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>The above is subject to the proviso that if the HMRI are satisfied, on application by the TOC concerned, that it is not practicable for that change to be achieved within this period, they may grant a deferment for an appropriate period in which the work is to be done. (para 14.28).</i></p>	TOCs ROSCOs

<p>JITPS</p> <p>12.5</p> <p>JITPS</p> <p>12.6</p> <p>JITPS</p> <p>12.9</p>	<p><b>JANUARY 2004</b></p> <p><b>Train protection warning systems</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Track fitment should include plain line signals where the risk from SPADs is established to be significant. (para 11.16).</li> </ul> <p><b>TPWS+</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If proved to be feasible, a full appraisal of the effect of one or more additional OSS on all traffic passing a signal should be carried out before fitment of additional OSS. (para 11.20).</li> <li>Fitment of TPWS+ should be concentrated on lines carrying High Speed Trains and on lines carrying other passenger trains which cannot be stopped within the normal overlap by TPWS-A. (para 11.20).</li> </ul> <p><b>European Train Control System (ETCS)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HSE should establish a programme for consultation and drawing up of Regulations for the fitment of ETCS with the objective of Regulations being in force within three years. (para 11.24).</li> <li>The selective fitment of GSM-R radio in advance of ETCS fitment to trains should be considered. For this purpose lines should be identified for the early fitment of ground and track equipment, to be followed by train-borne equipment. (para 11.27).</li> </ul>	<p>RT</p> <p>RT &amp; TOCs</p> <p>RT</p> <p>HMRI</p> <p>RT &amp; TOCs ROSCOs</p>

Part 2	<p><b>SEPTEMBER 2004</b></p>	
Part 2	<p><b>The accreditation of suppliers and producers of services</b></p>	
24.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Suppliers of products or services of a safety-critical kind for use on, or in regard to, the railways in Great Britain should be required to hold an accreditation as a condition of being able to engage in that activity. But the features of such a system require further study. (para 7.73)</i></li> </ul>	HSC
Part 2	<p><b>Licensing</b></p>	
25.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There should be a system for the licensing and central recording of those who are qualified for the driving of trains in respect of their knowledge of the rules and regulations and the traction for which they have been assessed as competent. Training providers or train operators should be accredited and common standards laid down for the purpose. Drivers' licences should require to be revalidated every three years. (para 7.74)</li> </ul>	RISB
26.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There should be a similar system for licensing the central recording of qualified signalmen, based on an assessment of their knowledge of the rules and regulations. Revalidation every three years should be required. (para 7.75).</li> </ul>	RISB
Part 2	<p><b>Railtrack and Railway Safety</b></p>	
31.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Railway Safety should cease to discharge the function of assessment for the purposes of the Safety Case Regulations. It should be for the safety regulator to decide to what extent, if at all, it should commission assessment from an independent body. (para 8.36).</i></li> </ul>	HSC
32.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>A provision should be made in the Safety Case Regulations imposing duty on Railtrack to carry out, or procure the carrying out by a suitably qualified body of, audits for the purposes presently set out in Regulation 9 of the 2000 Regulations. (para 8.37).</i></li> </ul>	As above
33.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The safety regulator should review the adequacy of Railtrack's auditing, carrying out its own audits to the extent that it considers appropriate, and dealing with instances of non-compliance whenever they arise. (para 8.37).</i></li> </ul>	HSE
34.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulations 12 and 13 of the 2000 Regulations should remain in effect. (para 8.37).</li> </ul>	
Part 2	<p><b>A rail industry safety body</b></p>	
40.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The function of the setting of Railway Group Standards should be assumed by a new rail industry body which is independent of both Railtrack Group plc and their subsidiaries and of the safety regulator. (paras 9.38, 9.46 and 10.1).</i></li> </ul>	Rail Regulator
41.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The body should be responsible for setting not only Railway Group Standards but also standards of the type which have ceased to be Group Standards in respect that they are concerned only with the interiors of rail vehicles. (para 10.7).</li> </ul>	As above

42.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It should be considered whether in due course: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) the separate existence of the SAB is unnecessary; and</li> <li>(ii) the RISSC should be come a strategy committee of the body (para 10.8).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	RISB
43.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should also be responsible for the preparation of any proposed changes to the Railway Group Standards Code. (para 10.8).</i></li> </ul>	Rail Regulator
44.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should have explicit duties to set and review standards. In the performance of its duties it should be subject to the supervision of the HSE through auditing and other actions. (para 10.9).</i></li> </ul>	As above
45.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The standards should be binding not only on members of the Railway Group but also on any company to which the requirement to comply currently applies whether by virtue of a licence condition or a contractual term. (para 10.10).</i></li> </ul>	As above
46.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should have the benefit of feedback from the auditing carried out by Railtrack and the HSE. (para10.14).</i></li> </ul>	Railtrack HSE
47.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should also be responsible for the accrediting of the suppliers of products and services and the licensing of individuals, subject to the supervisory activity of the safety regulator. (para10.15).</i></li> </ul>	Rail regulator
48.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The body should take any active role in steps to streamline the processes for the approval of new rail vehicles.(para 10.17).</li> </ul>	RISB
49.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should be set up as a new legal entity, independent of any company in the rail industry and of any part of that industry. It should have the power and the duty to take binding decisions. (para 10.21).</i></li> </ul>	Rail regulator
50.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The arrangement of the governance of the body should include provision for the representation of railway operators and of any other company to which the requirement comply with Railway Group Standards or the additional standards referred to in Recommendation 41 applies, whether by virtue of a licence condition or a contractual term. There should also be representation of the manufacturers and suppliers of infrastructure equipment and rolling stock, and the three main rail trade unions. (para 10.22).</i></li> </ul>	Rail regulator
51.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should have an independent chairman and a number of independent members with suitable practical experience. (para 10.23).</i></li> <li><i>There should be a clear and easily accessible means of resolving any matter which is in dispute. (para 10.23).</i></li> </ul>	As above
52.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Consideration should be given to the constitution of the body by modification of Railtrack's network licence and the licences of the other railway operators. (para 10.26).</i></li> </ul>	As above
53.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should be funded by means of a levy on the companies covered by the requirements referred to in Recommendation 50. (para 10.27)</i></li> </ul>	As above
54.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The body should also exercise a number of functions to assist the members of the rail industry to collaborate in the promotion of safety, including:</i></li> </ul>	As above
55.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>(i) establishing and managing system authorities;</i></li> <li><i>(ii) funding and sponsoring research and development;</i></li> <li><i>(iii) monitoring and reporting on the industry's safety</i></li> </ul>	RISB

56.	<p><i>performance;</i></p> <p>(iv) <i>developing the annual Railway Group Safety Plan;</i></p> <p>(v) <i>disseminating good practice; and</i></p> <p>(vi) <i>providing safety leadership (para 10.29)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Even if the European Directive on Railway Safety in its final form requires that responsibility for setting standards such as Railway Group Standards are to be taken over by the safety regulator, a rail industry safety body should be set up and assume the functions referred to in Recommendations 47, 48, 55 and 70. (para 10.30).</li></ul>	

	<b>ON-GOING AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	
JITPS	<b>European Train Control System (ETCS)</b>	
12.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fitment of ETCS to lines covered by Directive 96/48/EC (Ten lines) and the draft Directive on Conventional lines should be supported by Regulations. (para 11.24).</li> <li>• Regulations should be in absolute terms and not dependent on reasonable practicability. (para 11.24).</li> <li>• The requirements and objectives to be achieved by Regulations in relation to major lines should be those set out in an Annex 10 [See below] of this report. (para 11.24).</li> </ul>	HMRI DETR  As above  As above
Part 1	<b>Support of the bereaved and injured</b>	
1.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The system for the reception of information about missing persons, casualties and survivors should be computerised. It should be possible for information which has been received to be entered directly into the computer and for information from it to be provided, to the extent appropriate, to callers. There should be a set procedure for the returning of a call. (para 4.119).</li> </ul>	ACPO ACPOS
Part 2	<b>Large scale projects and the case for system authorities</b>	
2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The arrangements for the establishment of system authorities should ensure that they are properly empowered, provide clear leadership and command the commitment of all parties to their work and decisions. System authorities require the means of enforcing their decisions. They should have adequate finances, through proper and equitable contributions from participating bodies. (para 4.48).</li> </ul>	Railtrack ATOC
Part 2	<b>Research and development</b>	
3.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subject to Recommendation 55, research and development should, as matters stand, be led by Railway Safety but with the support of the SRA and the Rail Regulator. Further funding should be based on a levy on the participating bodies in proportion to their railway-based income. (para 4.54).</li> </ul>	Railway Safety SRA Rail Regulator
Part 2	<b>The role of the trade unions</b>	
11.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management should ensure that the elected representatives of the employees, whether they be union members or not, have a significant role in the management of safety. (para 4.99).</li> </ul>	Rail Industry
Part 2	<b>Safety leadership within individual companies</b>	
12.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Chairman and Chief Executives of companies should make continually clear to all their employees and passengers a lasting commitment to improve safety performance. (para 5.21).</li> </ul>	Rail industry
Part 2	<b>Risk assessment</b>	
16.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The greater use of risk assessment in the rail industry is commended. (para 5.42).</li> </ul>	Rail industry

Part 2	<p><b>Railway Group Standards</b></p>	
17.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There should be a systematic review of the standard setting process to assess whether it is effective in achieving its overall aim of safe interworking. (para 6.18).</li> </ul>	Railway Safety RISB
Part 2	<p><b>Railtrack and Railway Safety</b></p>	
27.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The transfer from Railtrack to the safety regulator of the function of acceptance of the safety cases of train operators and station operators (and their material revisions), and the removal from the S&amp;SD of their function in regard to safety cases and Group Standards, are endorsed. (para 8.28).</i></li> </ul>	
Part 2	<p><b>The safety regulator</b></p>	
35	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The HSE, through the HMRI should continue to fulfil the function of safety regulator for the railways. However, it is imperative that the HSE are provided with adequate resources in order to fulfil their role. (para 9.66)</i></li> </ul>	HM Government
37.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Government should use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that standards such as Railway Group Standards are not required by the European Directive on Railway Safety in its final form to be set by the safety regulator, and that the draft Directive is modified to such extent as is necessary for that purpose. (para 9.74).</li> </ul>	As above
Part 2	<p><b>The implementation of recommendations</b></p>	
74.	<p>As in the case of the report on Part 1 of the Inquiry, a review of compliance with the above recommendations should be conducted on behalf of the HSC within six months of publication of this report, and further reviews should be put in hand as necessary thereafter. The HSC should publish the outcome of such reviews.</p>	HSC